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INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND THE
THEORY OF CONTRACT DESIGN
Robert E. Scottt
George G. Triantist
We are delighted to accept this invitation to write a short essay on
the economic theory of incomplete contracts and to illuminate its cur-
rent and potential impact on the legal analysis of contracts and con-
tract law. Economic contract theory has made significant inroads in
legal scholarship over the past fifteen years, and this is a good time to
take stock of its strengths and weaknesses. Several recent publications
in the Yale Law Journal have offered evaluations of the contributions
of contract theory.' In this essay, we offer our opinion as to its future
path in legal scholarship.2 In particular, we suggest that economic
contract theory should incorporate a more textured understanding of
the process for judicial enforcement of contracts. In Part I, we de-
scribe briefly the economic theory of incomplete contracts and sum-
marize its most important lessons for lawyers. In Part I, we highlight
a limiting feature of economic contract theory: its stylized representa-
tion of legal enforcement in the concept of verifiability. We then out-
line an agenda for research that incorporates a more sophisticated
understanding of litigation in the analysis of contract design. We de-
t David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor, University of Virginia School of
Law; Justin W. D'Atri Visiting Professor of Law, Business and Society, Columbia Law School.
Perre Bowen Professor, University of Virginia School of Law; Visiting Professor of
Law, Yale Law School.
I See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Valuing Modem Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881 (2003);
Richard Craswell, In That Case, What Is the Question? Economics and the Demands of Con-
tract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903 (2003); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law
After Three Decades: Success or Failure, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003); Alan Schwartz & Robert
E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory].
2 In this respect, we offer a somewhat different prediction for the future than the pessi-
mistic assessment of Eric Posner or the more optimistic perspective of Ian Ayres. See Posner,
supra note 1; Ayres, supra note 1.
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scribe briefly the initial steps we have taken in this direction in a
forthcoming article.
I. INCOMPLETE CONTRACT THEORY FOR LAWYERS, IN A NUTSHELL
The economic theory of contracts is primarily about contract de-
sign, though it indirectly yields normative insights for contract law.4
The literature assumes that the private goal of contracting parties is to
maximize the shared value created by a contract (the "surplus"). The
value created by an exchange is straightforward: in the sale of a wid-
get, the buyer values the widget more than the seller. But how does a
contract create additional value? By "contract," lawyers usually mean
a legally binding promise to act in the future, such as the promise to
deliver a good on a specified future date in exchange for a promise to
pay a specified price. There are a number of reasons why parties
might contract for future performance. First, they may reside in geo-
graphically distant locations so that the tender of performance and its
acceptance occur at different times. Second, one party may extend
credit to the other so that the performance of the debtor is postponed
until a future date. Third, the parties may benefit by shifting risks
between each other. Fourth, one or both of the parties may be in a
position to make investments in anticipation of the exchange that will
increase the exchange value by either (a) lowering the cost of per-
formance or (b) raising the benefit from performance. 6 Economic
contract theory, however, is particularly interested in the last of these
purposes because it raises intriguing challenges in managing the con-
flicts between the parties' shared and private incentives.7
3 Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
4 For discussion see Aaron S. Edlin, Breach Remedies, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 174-79 (Peter Newman, ed. 1998) [hereinafter NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY] (using contract theory to evaluate standard common-law contract
remedies); Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 1 (using contract theory to develop a
normative theory of contract law for firms and other business entities).
5 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979) ("A contract is a prom-
ise.., for the breach of which the law gives a remedy .... ).
6 For discussions of risk shifting and relation-specific investments as the two paradig-
matic reasons why parties wish to make legally enforceable contracts, see Schwartz & Scott,
Contract Theory, supra note 1, at 556-65; Alexander J. Triantis and George G. Triantis, Timing
Problems in Contract Breach Decisions, 41 J.L. & ECON. 163, 170-72 (1998).
7 Economists distinguish between self (or selfish) specific investment and cooperative in-
vestment. For example, a seller may invest to reduce its own cost of performance (self) or to
increase the value of its performance to the buyer (cooperative). Efficient cooperative invest-
ment can be more difficult to motivate than efficient self investment. For example, when rene-
gotiation is permitted, a contract may be insufficient to motivate cooperative investment. See
Yeon-Koo Che & Donald Hausch, Cooperative Investment and the Value of Contracting, 89
AMER. ECON. REV. 125 (1999); Ilya Segal, Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for
Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 57 (1999). Specific investment that is selfish is
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Contracts can protect, and thereby encourage, what economists
call "specific investments" and what lawyers refer to as "reliance
expenditures." Specific investments are made when the resources
constituting each party's investment generate more value if they are
deployed in the relationship than if they are used for other purposes.
Economists identify the optimal level of specific investment as "ex
ante efficiency." At the same time, contractual commitments that mo-
tivate efficient investment ex ante can upset the efficiency of ex-
changes ("ex post efficiency") by compelling exchange when there is
no surplus to be gained. The source of this problem is that forward
contracts are made under uncertainty as to the cost and value of the
contractual performance. A contract can commit a party to an ex-
change that might later become wasteful in that the cost to the promi-
sor of performance exceeds the value to the promisee. At the time of
the contract, therefore, the parties should seek' to ensure that the ex-
change takes place in all circumstances when it produces value, but
not when it is wasteful.
The objectives of ex ante and ex post efficiency are in tension
when parties contract under uncertainty. This is because the commit-
ment necessary to protect the specific investments that generate the
expected contractual surplus is often antithetical to the flexibility
needed to ensure ex post efficiency. It may turn out, for example, that
the value of the contract performance to the promisee is less than the
promisor's cost of performance. Under these circumstances, the par-
ties would want the flexibility to avoid an inefficient trade. But an
effort to build in flexibility (say by agreeing to renegotiate an ineffi-
cient contract ex post) may expose the party that has made sunk cost
investments to the risk of exploitation by the noninvesting party. This
prospect, in turn, may cause the investing party to reduce or even
decline to make welfare enhancing investments, thus undermining ex
ante efficiency.
A benchmark solution to the dual objective of ex ante and ex post
efficiency is the complete, contingent contract-one that specifies
obligations in each possible state of the world. Such a contract en-
sures that performance occurs when, but only when, it is efficient.
And, either by directly specifying an obligation to make a specific
investment or by compelling exchange in states when it yields a sur-
plus, the complete, contingent contract encourages the efficient
easier to motivate with appropriate contracts. For purposes of our exposition, we confine our
attention to selfish specific investment.
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amount of specific investing. Unfortunately, however, complete, con-
tingent contracts are impeded by the transaction costs of contracting.
Rather than speaking in general terms about "transaction costs,"
contract theorists now identify and analyze separately distinct catego-
ries of such costs. The most salient categories in economic theory
stem from the fact that information is costly, sometimes prohibitively
so. Building on this more precise analysis, the information costs of
contracting can be separated according to two distinct stages of con-
tracting. At the front-end stage, parties incur ex ante transaction costs,
including the costs of anticipating future contingencies and writing a
contract that specifies an outcome for each one. At the back-end
stage, parties incur ex post enforcement costs, including the costs of
observing and proving the existence (or nonexistence) of any relevant
fact after uncertainty has been resolved. Both ex ante and ex post con-
tracting costs, then, prevent parties from writing complete contracts
and give rise to what economists refer to as the problem of incom-
plete contracts.
The incompleteness of a contract has a different meaning to an
economist than to a lawyer. To a lawyer, a contract may be incom-
plete in failing to describe the obligations of the parties in each possi-
ble state of the world. Should a state of the world materialize that falls
within the gap, the enforcing court must choose either to decline to
enforce the contract or to fill the gap with a default obligation. The
problem with this conception of incompleteness is that it is difficult to
explain why parties would leave such gaps. After all, the cost to mak-
ing contracts complete in this sense is trivial: the parties can simply
provide for an obligation that applies to a broadly defined set of con-
8tingencies. For example, a contract term that states, "the seller shall
deliver a blue widget on September 1, 2005 for a price of $10,000,"
completely defines the parties' obligations, even if the contract is not
efficient.
Economists use incompleteness in a different sense. A contract is
incomplete if it fails to provide for the efficient set of obligations in
each possible state of the world. Such a contract is "informationally
incomplete" even though it is "obligationally complete" in the sense
that it does not contain any gaps. Suppose that, in return for a pay-
ment of $10,000, the seller promises to deliver a blue widget to the
buyer on a specified date. As just noted, this contract is obligationally
complete. But if there are circumstances in which the widget costs
8 Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Contracts, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1641 (2003); George G. Triantis, Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the
Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 450, 464-68 (1992) (arguing that
contracts are rarely obligationally incomplete).
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more to produce than it is worth to the buyer, the performance of this
contract is inefficient. Thus, the contract is incomplete in the eco-
nomic sense.
What obstacles might prevent the parties from completing their
contract by providing explicitly that the seller will not produce and
deliver the widget in this contingency? In contract theory, incom-
pleteness is due to the fact that information is costly and sometimes
unavailable to (a) the parties at the time of contracting or (b) the par-
ties or the enforcing court at the time of enforcement. We refer to the
former as "front-end" transaction costs and the latter as "back-end"
enforcement costs. In particular, consider the information necessary
to identify contingencies and to provide for the optimal trade obliga-
tions in each contingency. On the front end, the parties might not
foresee all possible contingencies or they would have to incur pro-
hibitively high negotiation and drafting costs to partition all contin-
gencies sufficiently to provide for efficient obligations in each case.
On the back end, contracts that provide optimal obligations for all
contingencies may be too costly to enforce because they require the
court to distinguish among too many possible states of the world,
some of which may be known only to one party or known to the par-
ties but not the court. Over the past twenty years or so, back-end ob-
stacles have driven a large body of the theorists' models: namely, that
some states of the world are not verifiable to a court, even though
they may be observable to both the parties. As we explain below, this
link between enforcement and contract design is a critical one, and is
worthy of more focused and careful analysis.
Since Eric Maskin's seminal contribution in 1977, 9 economists
have developed models of "mechanism design" as a way of eliciting
information from two mutually informed contracting parties. 10 These
mechanisms can be used to resolve back-end information obstacles
and, in particular, enable a court to verify private information that is
observable to both parties." For example, assume that demand for the
9 Eric Maskin, Nash Equilibrum and Welfare Optimality, reprinted in 66 REV. ECON.
STUD. 23 (1999) (originally distributed as an MIT Mimeo in 1977).
10 A mechanism is a simple device that compares the announcements of the parties and
rewards them on the basis of this comparison. The structure of the reward induces the parties to
reveal nonverifiable facts to a court or other decision-maker. For a review, see John Moore,
Implementation, Contracts, and Renegotiation in Environments with Complete Information, in I
ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY: SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS, 182 (Jean-Jacques Laffont ed.,
1992); ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY, 857-918 (1995).
11 For concise but moderately technical discussions of these implementation mechanisms,
see Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY, supra note 4 at
277-83 Patrick W. Schmitz, The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of
Recent Topics in Contract Theory, 53 BuLL. OF ECON. RES. 1 (2001).
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contract good is observable by the parties but cannot be verified by a
court. The contract specifies a price of $100 if demand for the good at
the time for performance is low and $200 if the demand for the good
turns out to be high. The mechanism feature of the contract might
provide that both parties must send messages to the court indicating
the state of demand ex post. If the messages are the same, then the
court orders the parties to trade. But if their responses differ, they are
both jailed for a long period.' 2 Under these assumptions, the parties
clearly are motivated to report the true state of demand to the court.
The premise of this argument, however, is at odds with the existing
litigation system. Although laws against perjury exist, they do not
operate in this manner and, in any event, perjury rules are almost
never invoked in civil trials. Many, if not most, implementation
mechanisms are similarly unrealistic.
To be sure, economists have also identified mechanisms for elicit-
ing information in more familiar institutions, such as auctions and
option contracts.' 3 For example, suppose that a buyer holds an option
to buy a good at a fixed price of $10. Setting aside the possibility of
renegotiation discussed below, the buyer's decision to exercise (or not
exercise) the option reveals that the buyer's valuation exceeds (or is
less than) $10. By ensuring that the trade occurs when it is efficient,
but not otherwise, this contract can induce efficient ex ante invest-
ment as well. 14 Option contracts and other similar implementation
mechanisms, however, are parameter-specific and are not general
solutions to back-end information problems.
An important concern of contract theory is the renegotiation of
agreements. The ability of parties to renegotiate an incomplete con-
tract can have mixed effects. First, renegotiation can ensure ex post
efficiency. Consider a contract that is incomplete because it lumps
12 Rather than jail, the mechanism might simply have the court prohibit the parties from
trading when their messages conflict. In any case, it is a dominant strategy under such a mecha-
nism for each party to report the ex post state truthfully. Quite obviously, the inability of the
parties to renegotiate the consequences of a mismatch is crucial to the revelation mechanism.
Thus, if courts were willing to specifically enforce the content of the messages, including the
penalty when the messages conflict, this form of contract can provide for efficient trade. The
fact that this enforcement assumption is not borne out in the real world may explain the absence
of such mechanisms from real contracts. Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Default Rule Project, 6
VA. J. 84, 87 (2002).
13 E.g., Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, 67 ECONOMETRICA 741,
755 (1999).
14 See Georg N61deke & Klaus M. Schmidt, Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solu-
tion to the Hold-Up Problem, 26 RAND J. ECON. 163 (1995) (explaining that option contracts
are preferable to contract renegotiations because of their simplicity and relative efficiencies);
Aaron Edlin & Benjamin Hermalin, Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Models, 16
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 395, 397 (2000) (noting that option contracts increase efficiency when the
improved bargaining position gained from the agent's efforts dominate the hold-up effect).
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together two states of the world by excusing performance in both:
performance is indeed inefficient in one state, but it is efficient in the
other. The reason for the incompleteness is that the distinction be-
tween the states is excessively costly to specify ex ante or verify ex
post. If the efficient state materializes, the parties can renegotiate the
terms of exchange so that the promisor will find it in her interest to
perform. It is sometimes said that the promisee will "bribe" the pro-
misor to perform. Conversely, the contract may require performance
in two lumped states and the parties may renegotiate to a no-trade
outcome when it is inefficient: here the promisee would "bribe" the
promisor not to perform.
While injecting the flexibility needed to promote ex post effi-
ciency, the prospect of renegotiation may, however, undermine ex
ante efficiency. Consider the case in which the parties renegotiate a
contract to achieve efficient performance. To do so, they must reach a
new agreement as to the division of the surplus created by their trade.
Unfortunately, this surplus includes the gains from any specific in-
vestment, and the investing party will have already incurred the in-
vestment costs. So, by sharing in the redivision of the surplus, the
noninvestor will enjoy a greater portion of the gains from the invest-
ment but will not bear a greater portion of the investment's sunk
costs. This prospect of being "held-up" upon renegotiation deters the
initial investment and thus, undermines ex ante efficiency.
Renegotiation can also unravel mechanisms designed to elicit in-
formation ex post. Consider the option contract introduced earlier in
which the seller makes a specific investment and the buyer has the
right to exercise an option to purchase the good at a specified price. If
the parties can renegotiate, the buyer might let his option expire once
the seller has made his investment in order to enter into a new con-
tract with the seller. If the seller's investment is specific to the con-
tract with the buyer (and thus of little or no value to other buyers), it
is a sunk cost once incurred. The buyer can thereby force a new bar-
gain over the price, by which he can hold-up the seller and capture a
greater share of the benefits from the seller's specific investments.
Anticipating this outcome, the seller would not make the specific in-
vestment and may decline to grant the option in the first place. This
prospect cannot be cured easily. Courts generally do not enforce con-
sensual prohibitions on contract modification. 15 And, even if they did,
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 cmt. a (1979); see also Beatty v. Gug-
genheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 381 (N.Y. 1919) ("Those who make a contract may
unmake it. The clause which forbids a change may be changed like any other .... Whenever two
men contract, no limitation self-imposed can destroy their power to contract again."); Zum-
winkel v. Legget, 345 S.W.2d 89, 93-94 (Mo. 1961) (reaffirming that parties to a contract are as
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these prohibitions would be difficult to enforce because it is relatively
easy to conceal a modification within a "new" agreement.
Rather than seeking to prevent renegotiation altogether, contract-
ing parties might try to regulate the renegotiation process so as to
predetermine how the surplus will be shared. Some models simply
posit, unrealistically, that the parties can agree in their initial contract
on a specific division of the surplus in the later renegotiation. 16 Re-
cent proposals are more realistic. For example, by allocating property
rights in assets specific to the exchange, the parties effectively assign
bargaining power in future negotiations to the property right holder .
7
Alternatively, the use of payment deposits or the design of quantity
terms can predetermine who will be bribing whom to perform.1
8
From the perspective of lawyers and legal scholars, therefore, the
most important contribution of economic contract theory is arguably
this systematic incorporation of renegotiation and its feedback effects
into the analysis of contracting. 19 Contract theory now examines the
promisor's strategy among three options: performance, breach, or
renegotiation. From this perspective, a contract sets the field for fu-
ture renegotiation of the terms of exchange after uncertainty has been
resolved. As noted above, a challenge for parties designing contracts
is to preordain or at least constrain the course of future renegotiation
so as to yield both ex ante and ex post efficiency. Ian Ayres nicely
frames the development:
[T]he new scholarship has turned a deeply accepted tenet of
the Coase Theorem on its head. Naive Coaseans tend to think
that the original endowment of entitlement should not affect
free to alter their contract as they were to originally make it). See generally Christine Jolls,
Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 203 (1997); Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 1, at 611-14.
16 See, e.g., Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Rey, Renegotiation Design
with Unverifiable Information, 62 ECONOMETRICA 257 (1994) (contending that correct invest-
ment incentives are established by setting the default point in renegotiation for one party and
assigning the other party bargaining power over the division of the renegotiation surplus).
17 Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory
of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore,
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990).
I8 See Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment
Under Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 98 (1996) [hereinafter Edlin, Cadillac
Contracts] (highlighting that up-front payments give the promisor the ability to hold up the
promisee in renegotiation and thus discourage excessive reliance); Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan
Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment, 86 AM. ECON.
REV. 478 (1996) (explaining that bargaining power in renegotiation is exogenously determined,
but the contract quantity is set so as to balance the likelihood of renegotiation to a lower or
higher value and thus cancel out under- and over-investment tendencies).
19 See Ayres, supra note 1, at 892-95 (responding to Posner, supra note 1).
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allocative efficiency. But the modern contract analysis shows
that even when renegotiation is perfect, the initial assignment
of rights can importantly influence the incentives of parties to
invest in unverifiable (and therefore noncontractible) amounts
of reliance. . . . But prior analysis [also] did not appreciate
that the parties' ex ante agreement could endogenously de-
termine the identity of who would have to bribe whom and
that manipulating the identity of the briber could have impor-
tant impacts on the efficient breach.2 °
As we will emphasize in Part II, this approach for assessing the ef-
fect of the prospect of renegotiation on initial contract terms has more
general application as scholars incorporate the parties' strategic be-
havior in other arenas, such as litigation. Economists begin by analyz-
ing the renegotiation game and then, by backward induction, assess
its effect on performance incentives and, ultimately, optimal contract
design. Similarly, we might begin by predicting the game in which
parties litigate disputes over their contract and work backward to the
optimal design of their ex ante contract.
H. BEYOND VERIFIABILITY: INCORPORATING THE PROCESS OF
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT IN CONTRACT THEORY
The distinguishing feature of a contract is that its terms are legally
enforceable by a judicial system that enjoys monopoly power over the
coercive enforcement of obligations. Enforcement is costly, at least in
part because the court cannot always observe the information needed
to determine the obligation associated with the materialized state of
the world. Contract theory simply posits that some factors-
occurrence of contingencies and performance of obligations-are
"not verifiable" by a court. The theory thus sets aside a category of
contract terms by assuming, a priori, that the information cost of en-
forcement of those terms outweighs the incentive benefits to the par-
ties. From this, it follows that parties will not agree to such terms
since they are conditioned on states of the world that cannot be veri-
fied by a court, even though they may be observable by both parties.
Although economists have elsewhere analyzed the process of ad-
versarial litigation, contract theory has been limited to this highly
stylized and binary conception of contract enforcement in which
terms are either verifiable or not. This is a sensible approach in the
course of developing a theory of contract design, but it yields predic-
tions that are clearly at odds with the real world. For example, con-
20 Ayres, supra note 1, at 895.
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tract theorists commonly label vague contract terms, such as "best
efforts," "reasonable care," and "good faith," as nonverifiable and
therefore not contractible.2 ' Yet, these terms are commonplace in
commercial contracts.
The gap between theory and practice in this regard stems from two
features of contract theory: (a) its reluctance to balance back-end and
front-end contracting costs and (b) the stylized conception of litiga-
tion in the theory of incomplete contracts. 22 We outline these limita-
tions briefly in this Part and we elaborate the analysis in our forth-
coming article.23
Parties contract to align their incentives closer to the efficient op-
timum. They incur front-end and back-end costs in doing so because
of the uncertainty about future states of the world. From the informa-
tional perspective of incomplete contracts, front-end transaction costs
are incurred when the parties identify the possible future states of the
world and determine the efficient obligations associated with each
state. Back-end enforcement costs include the expected costs of litiga-
tion. The objective of contracting parties is to maximize the incentive
bang for their contracting-cost buck. They should incur contracting
costs, therefore, as long as the resulting increase in the sum of (a) the
transaction costs of writing the contact and (b) the expected costs of
enforcement are less than the marginal incentive gain (in motivating
more efficient reliance).
21 As Oliver Hart explains:
The quality of [my] book is observable, in the sense that anybody can read
it .... However, it would have been difficult for Oxford University Press and
me to have written a contract making my royalties a function of quality, since if
a dispute arose it would be hard for either of us to prove that the book did or
did not meet some pre-specified standard. (For this reason my royalties are
made to depend on some (more or less) verifiable consequences of quality, e.g.,
sales.) In other words, quality is not verifiable.
OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 37-38 n.15 (1995). See also,
BERNARD SALANIE, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS 175-91 (1997); Alan Schwartz, Relational
Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992) (arguing that parties will contract out of a vague standard, such as best
efforts, in which the application of the standard turns on nonverifiable information and predict-
ing that courts will decline to complete such contracts when the performance condition is non-
verifiable).
22 As one scholar explained:
[It might be argued that] incomplete contract theorists lack a coherent model
that would unambiguously define the set of feasible contracts starting from first
principles (the cost of writing contracts, etc ... ) and optimize over this set. I
am for example worried about the "observable but nonverifiable" assumption,
namely the postulate that the state of nature is ex post observed by several par-
ties... and yet the elicitation of this information takes only crude forms ....
Tirole, supra note 13, at 752.
23 Scott & Triantis, supra note 3.
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The parties can reduce contracting costs (or reach further incentive
gains) by trading off front-end and back-end costs. For example, in-
stead of incurring the front-end costs of identifying obligations for
many different states of the world, the parties may choose to have
these obligations filled in by the court at the enforcement stage. In
this way, the parties can shift front-end costs to the back end and vice
versa. This trade-off is well known in the literature on the choice be-
tween rules and standards in public regulation. 24 But it has been
missed by contract theorists whose concern with verifiability has led
them to exclude the possibility of vague standards in contracts.25
In many cases, there may be savings on transaction costs from
shifting costs to the back end through the use of vague standards. Al-
though a court may not have perfect information (indeed, some in-
formation may even be nonverifiable), its information may yet be
superior to (less costly than) that of the parties at the time they con-
tract. In particular, the parties would need to consider all possible
states of the world in their initial contract, while the court need only
identify the single materialized state of the world and the efficient
obligations in that state. By using broad standards such as "best ef-
forts," the parties defer this task to the litigation stage. Moreover, they
may also wish to set constraints on those prospective determinations
by defining a space within which these obligations are derived. Thus,
they may agree that one party will exert best efforts or act in a com-
mercially reasonable manner. And, then, the parties may supplement
those standards with examples that further guide the court.26 For in-
stance, a food-chain franchisee may promise to exert best efforts in
protecting the value of the trademark, including the maintenance of a
clean restaurant.2 7 Under accepted maxims of interpretation, the com-
24 Rules purport to specify the content of an obligation ex ante, while standards leave a
greater portion of the substantive provisions to be determined after the regulated behavior has
occurred. See generally, Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557 (1993).
25 The link between nonverifiability and standards has been expressed differently by con-
tract theorists. A common formulation, such as that offered by Oliver Hart, supra note 21,
assumes that in order to verify a standard, contracting parties would be required to prove in
court the specific characteristics that make up the standard. Such specification costs would
either be costly to incur ex ante and/or the enforcement costs would be too costly ex post. En-
forcement costs include the costs of uncertainty if the court is left to determine an obligation
without any pre-specification by the parties. However, this conclusion ignores the possibilities
of trading-off front-end and back-end costs as well as the important fact that under our litigation
system, standards are enforced indirectly by parties offering competing proxies for the standard
in question. Thus, courts only need to make a relative choice as to which proxy is closer to the
standard in question. For further discussion see Scott & Triantis, supra note 3.
26 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv.
1089, 1106 (1981).
27 Id.; see also, e.g., Taco Bell Corp. Franchise Agreement Sample Copy, section 3.1,
http://library.consusgroup.comlibrary-sbn/146/146107.asp. (last visited Sept. 9, 2005). See
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bination of precise terms together with a broad standard will confine
the "space" for admissible evidence of compliance (or noncompli-
ance) with the standard to those facts that are similar in kind to the
listed examples. 28
The second weakness of economic contract theory stems from the
fact that its conception of verification contemplates an enforcement
mechanism that relies on the finding of an objective truth.29 In fact,
courts neither investigate the truth on their own nor require certainty
before enforcing a contract. Unlike criminal adjudication that com-
pares the information of the court to an objective measure ("reason-
able doubt"), judgments in civil trials compare the case presented by
each of the parties. The evaluation of the evidence is relative rather
than absolute: the court renders its decision on the "preponderance of
evidence" or the "balance of probabilities." To be sure, the court may
ultimately base its judgment on inaccurate or incorrect information,
but the effect of this risk is significantly more complex than what can
be represented by a simple categorization of potential contract terms
into groups of "verifiable" and "nonverifiable" factors.
Similarly, although the cost of enforcement is an important factor
in contract design, economic contract theory treats it as exogenous.
But, in fact, litigation costs are the endogenous product of the strate-
gies of the parties within the rules imposed by the laws of evidence
and civil procedure. These litigation strategies, in turn, are interactive
in the sense that the decisions of each party-whether to invest in
litigation and how much to expend-are a function of the expected
litigation expenditures of the other party.
A more useful analytical approach, therefore, is to take the existing
litigation system as a given and then ask: how would parties design
their contracts in light of the future course of litigation, including its
risk of error and its cost? In this way, the impact of the adversarial
system on contract design can be examined more carefully by back-
ward induction. As an example, consider the risk of legal error in the
judicial enforcement of a contract. Legal error may mean that a
breaching promisor may not be held liable or that a performing pro-
misor may be erroneously found in breach. As a result, the promisor's
generally, Scott & Triantis, supra note 3, at 37-39.
28 Scott & Triantis, supra note 3, at 39-43. Under the maxim ejusdem generis, the meaning
of the general language is then limited to matters similar in kind or classification to the enumer-
ated specific terms. See, e.g., Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 179
(1st Cir. 1995) (holding that when a contract lists specific benefits, any other benefit not so
listed is excluded).
2 George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A Response to the
Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2,62 LA. L. REv. 1065 (2002).
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incentive to perform may be undermined. Nevertheless, as long as the
probability of liability is greater following actual breach than follow-
ing performance, the promisor does have some incentive to perform.
That incentive is a function of the magnitude of the risk of legal error
that, in turn, is a function of the investment made by each party in
litigation. Experts in the process of litigation commonly assert that the
cost of proving the existence or absence of a fact is lower for the
party alleging the truth than the lying party. Given a fixed amount at
stake, therefore, the truthful party will invest a greater amount in liti-
gation and this improves the odds of the court coming up with the
truth.3"
On the other hand, litigation costs can offset the gains from im-
proving the incentives of the promisor to perform. Within the adver-
sarial system, litigation costs and errors are the product of the inter-
acting strategies of the parties to initiate, defend, and present evidence
at trial. These strategies are regulated by an elaborate regime of evi-
dentiary and procedural rules. Within those rules, the parties have
discretion to decide how much to invest in the production of evidence
in court. Their investments may well depart from the level that is effi-
cient from the parties' ex ante perspective. 31 The parties' ex post deci-
sion is based on the amount at stake; in many cases, therefore, they
are simply fighting over a division of the spoils. Nonetheless, the ex-
pected outcome does affect incentives to perform. Thus, at the time of
contracting, the parties would weigh the expected cost of enforcing
each contract term against the incentive gains derived from its ex-
pected enforcement (including the risk of error). This trade-off, in
turn, affects the choice among rules and standards that we described
above.
The parties may also structure their contract to realign litigation
incentives by manipulating evidentiary and procedural rules, at least
to the extent allowed by law. The bounds of their discretion to do so
remain unclear, though there are many examples of contractual provi-
sions that shape the fact-finding process in litigation, including choice
of venue clauses, confession-of-judgment clauses, shortened limita-
30 See, e.g., Daniel L. Rubinfeld & David E.M. Sappington, Efficient Awards and Stan-
dards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings, 18 RAND J. ECON. 308, 310 (1987) (arguing that inno-
cent parties signal innocence by spending more effort than guilty parties because "[i]f this were
not the case, litigation would serve no purpose, since it would not enable the court to distinguish
more accurately the innocent from the guilty").
31 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.
REv. 1477, 1486 (1999) (discussing the possibility that parties will either underinvest or overin-
vest in the search for evidence, relative to the social optimum); Steven Shavell, The Social
Versus the Private Incentive To Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333,
334 (1982) (noting that a plaintiff does not internalize the litigation cost of the defendant).
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tions periods, and the choice of trial by jury or judge. Of course, par-
ties can opt out of the state judicial process entirely by agreeing to
resolve their disputes by arbitration, which affords them even more
flexibility to constrain discovery, limit the duration of trial, limit the
number of witnesses, and so on.
An important element of fact finding is the assignment of burdens
of proof. The law assigns these burdens as default terms, but the par-
ties themselves may alter these burdens in their contract. 32 The gen-
eral rule is that plaintiffs carry the burden of production and of proof
in establishing the elements of the case, while defendants carry the
burden with respect to a category of "affirmative defenses. 33 For
example, the plaintiff suing to recover damages for breach of contract
carries the burden of proving an enforceable promise, the failure to
perform as promised and the amount of damages. The defendant has
the burden of proving, say, a mistake in the formation of the contract,
frustration of its purpose or that the plaintiff failed to mitigate her
damages. The parties thus can reallocate burdens by choosing which
party will be the plaintiff in the event of the dispute and who thereby
will carry the burden of establishing whether the promisor has per-
formed. A simple technique is the use of a deposit.34If a buyer makes
a deposit, she must sue the seller to recover the deposit in the event of
a dispute. If there is no deposit, the seller must sue to recover the
price.35 We suggest that other provisions, such as termination rights,
serve a similar purpose.36
32 An example of this burden shifting can be found in the standard indemnification agree-
ment between DAOU Systems, Inc., and its directors and officers, which states:
Upon making a request for indemnification, Indemnitee shall be presumed to
be entitled to indemnification under this Agreement and the Company shall
have the burden of proof to overcome that presumption in reaching any con-
trary determination .... Anyone seeking to overcome this presumption shall
have the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion by clear and convincing
evidence.
University of Missouri-Columbia, Contracting and Organizations Research Institute, CORI
Contracts Library, http://cori.missouri.edu (CORI contract ID# 2382) (last visited Sept. 9,
2005). For further discussion see Scott & Triantis, supra note 3, at 54-55.
33 KENNETH S. BROuN et al., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 338 (John W. Strong, ed., 5th
ed. 1999).
34 Recall that an up-front payment also determines who makes the breach-or-perform de-
cision, which is significant in Edlin, Cadillac Contracts, supra note 18.
35 Of course, if the buyer alleges expectation or reliance damages as well, she may have to
sue and carry the burden of proof.
36 See Scott & Triantis, supra note 3, at 61-66 (suggesting termination clauses alter burden
allocation).
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III. CONCLUSION
Until recently, contracts scholarship worked within the Holmesian
paradigm that a contracting party either performs the contract or pays
damages for breach. Economic contract theory has introduced
renegotiation as a third possible outcome, and has traced the
implications of anticipating the prospect of renegotiation on contract
design. By introducing the adversarial litigation process, we can add
another strategic game that the parties anticipate in structuring their
contract. The analysis could be further extended in a number of other
directions. For example, the possibility that disputes are settled in the
course of litigation but before trial, or that the parties choose to
arbitrate rather than litigate provides further opportunities for
assessing the effects of back-end processes on contract design. 37 This
is an ambitious research agenda, to be sure. But setting it out at this
time reminds us how much work remains to be done in the theory of
incomplete contracts until it yields a systematic explanation of
observed contracting patterns.
37 See, e.g., Albert Choi & George G. Triantis, The Effect of Settlement on Contract Design
(September 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors); Albert Choi & George G.
Triantis, Contractual Choice Between Arbitration and Litigation (Feb. 2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
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